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ABSTRACT
This paper accounts for the observed increase in unemployment duration relative to the
unemployment rate in the U.S. over the past thirty years, typified by the record low level of short-term
unemployment. We show that part of the increase is due to changes in how duration is measured, a
consequence of the 1994 Current Population Survey redesign. Another part is due to the passage of the
baby boomers into their prime working years. After accounting for these shifts, most of the remaining
increase in unemployment duration relative to the unemployment rate is concentrated among women,
whose unemployment rate has fallen sharply in the last two decades while their unemployment duration
has increased. Using labor market transition data, we show that this is a consequence of the increase in
women's labor force attachment.
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Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, the U.S. unemployment rate trended
consistently upwards. The unemployment rate attained at successive cyclic peaks
increased from 3.4 percent in September 1968 to 4.6 percent in October 1973, 5.6
percent in May 1979, and 7.2 percent in April 1981 (see Figure 1). In November
1982, the worst point of the 1981–1982 recession, the unemployment rate reached
a postwar high of 10.8 percent. Since that time, however, unemployment has fallen
back towards the levels of the late 1960s. By March 1989, the unemployment rate had
dropped to 5.0 percent, and, from October 1999 through the end of 2000, it hovered
near 4.0 percent.
During most business cycles, there is a strong correlation between the unemploy-
ment rate and the average length of an unemployment spell, so, not surprisingly,
unemployment durations increased steadily during the 1970s. But, subsequently,
unemployment durations have not fallen nearly as much as the decline in the un-
employment rate might have led one to expect. For example, the top left panel of
Figure 2 shows that, historically, the mean duration of in-progress unemployment
spells,1 the solid line, closely tracked the unemployment rate, the dashed line (de-
picted on a diﬀerent scale). As the unemployment rate increased from business-cycle
peak to business-cycle peak during the 1970s, mean unemployment duration followed
suit, rising from 8 to 11 weeks during the decade. But, while the unemployment rate
has subsequently declined, mean unemployment duration has not fallen commensu-
rately. As a result, the mean duration of an unemployment spell was ﬁfty percent
longer at the end of the 1990s than at the end of the 1960s. The remaining panels of
Figure 2 explore how the unemployment-duration distribution has shifted over time.
1Throughout this paper we use data on the duration of in-progress unemployment spells rather
than on the duration of completed spells.
1The short-term unemployment rate, deﬁned as the fraction of the labor force that has
been unemployed for 0 to 4 weeks, is at its lowest sustained rate since the early 1950s,
forty percent lower than the levels that prevailed from 1975 to 1985 and signiﬁcantly
lower than the levels that one would expect from the historical relation between the
short-term and the aggregate unemployment rates. The long-term (15- to 26-week)
unemployment rate has also declined steadily during the last two expansions, although
it remains slightly high by historical standards. But most of the action comes from
the increase in the very long-term (more than 26-week) unemployment rate. In 1969,
persons unemployed half a year or more accounted for just 0.16 percent of the labor
force; at the peak of each of the last three expansions, three times as large a share of
the labor force had similarly long spells of unemployment.2
This paper seeks to explain the breakdown in the historical relation between the
aggregate unemployment rate and measures of unemployment duration. There are
several reasons why understanding this change is important. First, if workers are risk
averse and labor-income risk cannot be insured, welfare is lower when unemployment
duration is longer, holding the unemployment rate constant. Essentially, longer un-
employment durations load more uninsurable risk onto individuals. Lucky workers
never lose their jobs, so these workers have a lower marginal utility of income than
do their less fortunate peers, who suﬀer long spells of joblessness. This suggests that
ignoring unemployment durations and focusing only on the low unemployment rate
at the end of the 1990s may overstate the strength of the U.S. economy. Similarly,
the long-term unemployed may lose skills or contact with the labor market, generat-
ing hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers 1987), and blocking the possibility of further
reductions in the unemployment rate. This will also limit the downward pressure
2Summers (1986)a n dKatz and Krueger (1999) have also commented on the increase in long-term
unemployment as a share of total unemployment.
2that the long-term unemployed place on wages, with the result that, in an economy
with many long-term unemployed, the Phillips curve may lie to the right of that in an
economy with shorter unemployment durations. On the other hand, the existence of
long unemployment durations suggests a positive role for government intervention in
the labor market. For example, retraining programs might help in reintroducing the
long-term unemployed to regular labor-market activity, thereby reducing unemploy-
ment duration without increasing the incidence of unemployment. Section 2 discusses
these issues in more detail.
We then turn to our main task, trying to understand the source of the recent in-
crease in unemployment duration. Each subsequent section focuses on one important
factor — Section 3 on measurement issues, Section 4 on the aging of the baby boom,
and Section 5 on labor-force attachment.
Measurement Issues. In 1994, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) redesigned
the Current Population Survey (CPS), the instrument used to measure the unem-
ployment rate and unemployment duration. There are reasons to suspect that this
redesign reduced the measured incidence of short-term unemployment. We conclude
that the redesign is likely to explain a decline of about half a percentage point in the
short-term (0- to 4-week) unemployment rate and an increase of about a half week in
mean unemployment duration, although it does not explain the increase in long-term
unemployment.
Aging of the Baby Boom. The mass of the U.S. population has shifted into age
groups that report longer unemployment spells. If one assumes that this demographic
shift has aﬀected only the share of workers in diﬀerent age groups, not unemployment
duration conditional on age, then the aging of the baby boom can explain another
3half percentage point decline in the short-term unemployment rate between 1980 and
2000 and another half-week increase in mean unemployment duration over the same
time period. It does little, however, to explain the rise in long-term unemployment.
Labor-Force Attachment. Most of the secular increase in unemployment dura-
tion is accounted for by women, whose unemployment duration has risen to approach
the male level. At the same time, women’s unemployment rate has declined towards
the men’s rate since 1980. This pattern suggests the possibility that increases in
women’s attachment to the labor force may be responsible for the aggregate trends.
Labor-force attachment aﬀects unemployment incidence and unemployment duration
in at least two ways. Workers who have a stronger attachment to the labor force
tend to stay unemployed when they lose a job, rather than dropping out of the labor
force. This raises both the unemployment rate and unemployment duration. On the
other hand, because these workers are unlikely to quit their jobs and exit the labor
force, they can build up stable employment relations with a minimal incidence of un-
employment. This reduces the unemployment rate and may also raise unemployment
duration by reducing the pool of workers who chronically transition out of the labor
force from unemployment.
We examine evidence on changes in the transition rates of workers across labor-
market states (employment, unemployment, and out of the labor force) in order to
explore the role that women’s increasing labor-force attachment has played in the
rise in unemployment duration relative to the unemployment rate. We ﬁnd that the
declining exit rate of employed women from the labor force is quantitatively important
for explaining both the decline in women’s overall unemployment rate and the increase
in their unemployment duration.
To summarize our ﬁndings, changes in measurement and changes in demographics
4each explain part of the increase in unemployment duration relative to the unemploy-
ment rate during recent years, especially for men. For women, an important part of
the explanation is the increase in their attachment to the labor market, which has
reduced their unemployment rate while raising their unemployment duration.
2 Theory
2.1 Unemployment Duration and Risk
In representative-agent models of the business cycle, labor-market activity is sum-
marized by the number of hours worked. Lucas (1987) has forcefully argued that,
in such an economy, there is little value to reducing the variance of output.3 But
representative-agent models may signiﬁcantly understate the cost of recessions if the
burden falls on a small subset of the population. According to this logic, the un-
employment rate is an important measure of economic activity in part because it
highlights the distributional consequences of recessions. For example, Gruber (1997)
and Browning and Crossley (2001) have shown that workers with low asset hold-
ings substantially reduce their consumption following job loss, although the eﬀect is
mitigated by unemployment insurance.
Unemployment duration, not just the unemployment rate, is an important deter-
minant of the distributional consequences of recessions. At one extreme, if unemploy-
ment spells are very brief, workers can easily use a small stock of savings to smooth
3Lucas asks how much consumption an individual would be willing to give up in order to eliminate
any variation of output around its deterministic trend. This presumes, not that recessions are periods
when output is below trend and that expansions are periods when output is on trend, but that
business cycle ﬂuctuations are symmetrical deviations around a trend. Lucas’s argument is based on
assumptions about individual preferences, in particular, about the extent of risk-aversion. Alvarez
and Jermann (2000) reach a similar conclusion using evidence from asset prices without having to
impose strong restrictions on preferences. They conclude that rational agents would forgo about
half a percent of their consumption in order to eliminate business-cycle-frequency ﬂuctuations.
5consumption across these spells, and hours worked will be a good measure of economic
activity. At the other extreme, if unemployment spells never end, no stock of savings
will be large enough to allow for consumption smoothing, and average measures will
be inadequate for describing individual activity.
To get at this idea more formally, we consider an economy inhabited by rational
workers who live for two periods.4 Workers inelastically supply labor and seek to
maximize their expected utility from consumption U1(c1)+U2(c2), where c1 ≥ 0a n d
c2 ≥ 0 are consumption in the ﬁrst and second period of life. We assume that the
utility function is concave, so workers are risk-averse. In each period, a fraction u of
them are unemployed and earn an unemployment beneﬁt b, and the remaining 1 − u
are employed at a ﬁxed wage w>b . If a worker is unemployed in the ﬁrst period of
her life, there is a probability λue that she will be employed in the second period; and,
symmetrically, a worker who is employed in the ﬁrst period may be unemployed in
the second period with probability λeu. λue is inversely related to the mean duration
of unemployment (which can vary between 1 and 2 periods in this simple model) since
it indicates how likely an unemployed worker is to ﬁnd a job. In order to ensure that
the unemployment rate in the second period is u as well, the number of workers who
ﬁnd a job after the ﬁrst period must equal the number of workers who lose a job,
uλue ≡ (1 − u)λeu.
A worker faces a lifetime budget constraint. She is able to borrow and lend at a
ﬁxed real interest rate r, so, if she earns y1 in the ﬁrst period and y2 in the second
period of her life, consumption must satisfy (1+r)c1+c2 =( 1+r)y1+y2. We assume
that c1 is chosen after y1 is realized and that c2 is chosen after y2 is realized. An
optimal consumption plan will depend on the worker’s fortune in the labor market
4The ideas contained here do not depend on the assumption of short-lived workers, although, in
a model with a longer time horizon, recurrence of unemployment, not just unemployment duration,
would be important for welfare.
6as well as on her expectation about future labor market prospects. For now, think
of the unemployment rate (u) and the probability that an unemployed person ﬁnds
a job in the second period (λue) as ﬁxed. A worker who is employed in the ﬁrst
period will choose to consume ce
1, while an unemployed worker will consume cu
1.I n
the second period, consumption will depend on the entire employment history, giving
four possible values — cuu
2 , cue
2 , ceu
2 ,a n dcee
2 — for a worker who is always unemployed,
unemployed then employed, and so on. The highest level of consumption in the second
period will be that enjoyed by a worker who was employed in both periods, while the
lowest level of consumption will be that experienced by a worker who was always
unemployed. It is not generally possible to rank cue
2 and ceu
2 except to say that they
both lie in the interval between cuu
2 and cee
2 .
It is important to realize that a worker can set a complete contingent path for
consumption, that is, choose the six consumption levels cu
1, ce
1, cuu
2 , and so on, before
realizing any labor-market outcome. Then she simply faces a lottery over the possible
consumption levels. When she is young, the chance that she consumes cu
1 is u and
the chance that she consumes ce
1 is 1 − u, independent of unemployment duration.
But, when she is old, the chance that she consumes cuu
2 is u(1 − λue), the product of
the probability that she is unemployed when young and the conditional probability
that she does not move to employment when old. Given the inverse relation between
λue and mean unemployment duration, this is increasing in mean duration for a ﬁxed
unemployment rate. Likewise, the chance that she consumes cee
2 is (1−u)(1−λeu)=
1−u(1+λue), where we use the fact that uλue ≡ (1−u)λeu to simplify the expression.
Again, this is increasing in mean unemployment duration for a ﬁxed unemployment
rate. The chance of each of the intermediate events, consuming cue
2 or ceu
2 ,i suλue,
decreasing in mean unemployment duration.
But now it is easy to show that shorter average unemployment duration for a
7ﬁxed unemployment rate must raise the worker’s expected utility.5 She can clearly
aﬀord the same consumption in the same states as before, so suppose for now that her
consumption plan conditional on employment status does not change. Then a higher
level of λue is the opposite of a mean-preserving spread. It has no eﬀect on ﬁrst-period
consumption, which remains a lottery placing probability u on cu
1 and otherwise yield-
ing ce
1. But, in the second period, it shifts probability mass away from the extreme
consumption levels cuu
2 and cee
2 and towards the intermediate levels. That is, the distri-
bution of consumption in the second period has the same mean, independent of λue,6
but the distribution with a higher value of λue second-order stochastically dominates
the distribution with a lower value. Then it follows immediately from Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970) that, holding the consumption plan ﬁxed, any risk-averse worker
is better oﬀ in an economy with shorter mean unemployment duration. Intuitively,
the utility gain from consuming cue
2 rather than cuu
2 exceeds the utility loss from con-
suming ceu
2 rather than cee
2 . Since the unemployment rate is the same in the ﬁrst and
second periods, the probability of consuming cue
2 must equal that of consuming ceu
2 .
But having higher transition rates λue and λeu for a ﬁxed unemployment rate raises
the probability of each event and, therefore, raises expected utility. All this ignores
the fact that, in an economy with shorter mean unemployment duration, the worker
can reoptimize her consumption plan. Doing so will trivially yield still higher utility.
This establishes that, for a given unemployment rate, workers prefer a shorter mean
unemployment duration.
5This argument ignores any general-equilibrium eﬀect on wages or interest rates. We thank
Fernando Alvarez for suggesting this method of proof.
6The expected value of consumption in the second period is given by expected lifetime income
minus expected ﬁrst-period consumption, or (2+r)(ub+(1−u)w)−(1+r)(ucu
1 +(1−u)ce
1), which
is independent of λue.
82.2 Unemployment Duration and Hysteresis
Unemployment duration is an excellent predictor of whether a worker will ﬁnd a job.
Figure 3 shows that the fraction of unemployed workers with a given unemployment
duration who ﬁnd a job in the following month is a decreasing function of duration.7
From 1976 to 2000, this probability exceeds ﬁfty percent for workers at the shortest
end of the duration distribution and falls to barely ten percent for workers who have
been unemployed for ninety weeks or more.
Broadly speaking, there are two possible explanations for this pattern. First,
workers may be heterogeneous. Unemployed workers with low exit probabilities are
dynamically sorted into long-term unemployment. According to this theory, changes
in mean unemployment duration simply reﬂect changes in the composition of job
losers. But there is some empirical evidence that workers who initially have a high
probability of ﬁnding a job are less likely to ﬁnd one if they have been unemployed
for a long time (see Abbring, van den Berg, and van Ours 2000). That is, unem-
ployment exhibits hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers 1987). This will be the case
if skills atrophy during unemployment (Pissarides 1992), if long-term unemployment
stigmatizes workers (Blanchard and Diamond 1994), or if the long-term unemployed
lose contact with social networks (Granovetter 1974, Montgomery 1991) and so do
not know where to look for good employment opportunities.
To the extent that these models help explain the decreasing hazard rate of ﬁnding
a job depicted in Figure 3, then there may also be a role for government intervention
7We constructed this ﬁgure by matching individual observations in the CPS across months. Ap-
pendix B discusses the matching process and its limitations in detail. Ideally, one would construct
this hazard rate directly from the observed cross-sectional distribution of unemployed workers’ un-
employment duration, but measurement errors, discussed in more detail in Section 3, make this
impossible. Crudely put, it would appear that workers who are unemployed for 51 weeks have a
negative probability of ﬁnding a job in the next week since so many more workers report 52 weeks
of unemployment.
9in retraining the long-term unemployed. For example, Becker (1964) predicts that
workers will bear the costs of general human capital. But, in the presence of credit
constraints, this may not be a realistic possibility for the long-term unemployed,
creating a role for subsidized training programs. Likewise, a ﬁrm with imperfect
information about worker quality may use unemployment duration as a screening
device. Although it knows that the long-term unemployed would be willing to accept
a low wage in return for a job, the ﬁrm also realizes that, if it manages to hire a good
worker from the long-term unemployed population, the market will quickly perceive
the worker’s high marginal product and drive up her wage. That is, other ﬁrms will
free-ride, reducing the ﬁrm’s information acquisition below its eﬃcient level. The
government can alleviate this problem by running training programs designed in part
to establish participants’ ability to partake in environments similar to the workplace.
In a similar vein, Caplin and Leahy (2000) argue that equilibrium unemployment
duration may be excessively long since, in an environment characterized by social
networks, unemployed workers do not internalize all the informational beneﬁts of
maintaining contact with the labor market. If this is correct, search subsidies for the
long-term unemployed may improve welfare by reconnecting groups of discouraged
workers with the labor market.
2.3 Unemployment Duration and Wage Pressure
The decreasing relation between unemployment duration and job-ﬁnding hazard rates
depicted in Figure 3 also suggests the possibility that the long-term unemployed may
put less downward pressure on wages than do the short-term unemployed. If this is
the case, an increase in unemployment duration will tend to shift the Phillips curve
10to the right and raise the NAIRU (nonaccelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment).8
To assess the quantitative signiﬁcance of this eﬀect, deﬁne an index of unemployment
pressure on the labor market equal to the unemployment rate at time t multiplied by
the job-ﬁnding probability of the average unemployed worker at time t.W e c a l c u -
late the latter term using the average job-ﬁnding rate conditional on unemployment
duration from 1976 to 2000, weighted by the unemployment-duration distribution
prevailing at t.F i g u r e 4 depicts the results. The index of unemployment pres-
sure closely tracks the aggregate unemployment rate, although the cyclic variation
is slightly muted. It thus seems unlikely that shifts in the unemployment-duration
distribution have caused substantive shifts in the Phillips curve.
3 Measurement Issues
An important issue with respect to analyzing movements in unemployment and unem-
ployment duration over time is whether these data have been aﬀected by the major
redesign of the CPS that was introduced in January 1994. This redesign included
important improvements in the survey questionnaire as well as the conversion of the
survey from a pencil-and-paper instrument to a computerized instrument. Available
evidence suggests that the redesign had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the overall unem-
ployment rate or on the unemployment rates for age/sex groups, with the limited
exception that it appears to have raised measured unemployment rates for persons
aged 55 and older (see Polivka and Miller 1998). The proper conclusions to draw
with respect to the measurement of unemployment duration, however, are less clear.
Two important changes in the design of the CPS could have aﬀected the mea-
surement of unemployment duration. The ﬁrst change is the use of dependent inter-
8A decrease in the number of out-of-the-labor-force workers moving directly into employment
could have a similar eﬀect, but we ﬁnd no evidence that such a shift has occurred.
11viewing. Households included in the CPS sample are interviewed for four consecutive
months, are out of the sample for the next eight months, and then are interviewed
for an additional four consecutive months. Prior to the redesign, an individual who
was reported as unemployed was always asked the duration of her unemployment
spell. Since the redesign, the unemployment duration of a worker who is unemployed
in consecutive months is calculated automatically on the basis of the spell length
recorded for the earlier month and the number of weeks between the two months’
survey reference periods. Among other possible eﬀects, this change can be expected
to have reduced the number of people recorded as having spells of 0 to 4 weeks du-
ration. The second change is to allow individuals to report unemployment duration
in months or years rather than only in weeks, although interviewers are instructed to
ask for duration in weeks for anyone reporting four or fewer months in their current
unemployment spell. It is not a priori obvious what eﬀect this change should have
had.
In Appendix A,w ed i s c u s so n ea p p r o a c ht oa n a l y z i n gt h ee ﬀ e c to ft h eC P Sr e -
design, the use of a parallel survey that was constructed explicitly for this purpose
(Polivka and Miller 1998). For reasons discussed in the Appendix, however, we are
hesitant to accept the results this approach yields for unemployment duration at
face value. Instead, we attempt to assess the likely eﬀect of the CPS redesign on
unemployment duration by directly measuring the quantitative signiﬁcance of the
design changes. Consider the eﬀect of dependent interviewing. Before the redesign,
there was no diﬀerence in the way in which unemployment duration was measured for
diﬀerent rotation groups. But, after the redesign, unemployment duration was mea-
sured diﬀerently for the “incoming rotation groups” (the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth months in
the sample) than it was for the rest of the sample. Substantial diﬀerences between
reported unemployment durations have subsequently emerged. According to time
12series that we constructed from the CPS, since the redesign about 6.5 percent more
of the unemployed workers in the incoming rotation groups report that their current
unemployment spell has lasted for less than four weeks, compared to the full sample
(Figure 5). There were no meaningful diﬀerences across rotation groups before the
CPS redesign, so this is almost certainly a redesign eﬀect. More to the point, from
1994 to 2000, the mean unemployment duration averaged 15.20 weeks for the full
CPS sample but only 14.83 weeks for the incoming rotation groups. Most of this
diﬀerence is accounted for by short-duration unemployment (0 to 4 weeks), which
averaged 1.97 percent of the labor force for the full sample after the CPS redesign
but 2.40 percent for the incoming rotation groups. On the other hand, the rates
of long-term unemployment (15 to 26 weeks) and very long-term unemployment (27
weeks and longer) were essentially unaﬀected by the switch to dependent interview-
ing. They averaged 0.68 and 0.79 percent, respectively, in the full sample and 0.67
and 0.78 percent, respectively, for the incoming rotation groups. Although it is likely
that the full sample estimates are more accurate (and certainly are based on a much
larger sample), the estimates for the incoming rotation groups are more comparable
with the pre-1994 data.9 Throughout the remainder of our analysis, we use only data
for the incoming rotation groups from 1994 forward.
Unfortunately, the absence of an obvious control group means that we cannot per-
form a similar assessment of the other relevant redesign change, allowing individuals
to report their unemployment duration in months or years instead of only in weeks.
The redesign resulted in a marked increase in the frequency with which certain un-
9In some cases, an individual observed as unemployed in two successive CPS interviews might in
fact brieﬂy have held a job in the intervening period, in which case she would have been properly
recorded as having had a very short unemployment duration in the second month. Research con-
ducted as part of the CPS redesign process suggested this to be a relatively rare event (Polivka and
Miller 1998) and, in any case, there is a real question as to whether holding a job for only a very
short time should be considered as having broken an otherwise continuing unemployment spell.
13employment durations were reported.10 For example, from 1994 to 2000, 98.5 percent
of unemployed workers in the incoming rotation groups who reported that their un-
employment spell had lasted between 49 and 55 weeks said that their spell had been
in progress for exactly 52 weeks (one year). During a roughly comparable period
a decade earlier, only 80.7 percent of these unemployment spells were reported as
having lasted exactly 52 weeks. Similarly, the share of 23- to 29-week spells that were
reported as lasting exactly 26 weeks (6 months) increased from 34.3 to 91.3 percent,
and the share of 36- to 42-week spells that were reported as lasting exactly 39 weeks
(9 months) increased from 11.0 to 88.6 percent. Other changes were less dramatic.
Obviously, when oﬀered the option to report their unemployment duration in
months or years rather than in weeks, many respondents choose a round number.
This need not bias the mean unemployment duration if as many workers report 52
rather than 51 weeks as report 52 rather than 53 weeks, but, in practice, that may
not have occurred. The fact that there are more workers with shorter unemployment
durations implies that symmetrical rounding errors like the one described above will
result in an increase in measured mean unemployment duration. On the other hand,
the rounding errors need not be symmetrical (Baker 1992). For example, it is plausible
that a worker is as likely to report a 45-week unemployment spell as lasting for nine
months as she is to report it lasting for one year. This may further bias the measured
unemployment duration, although the direction of the bias is not ex ante obvious.
Fortunately, any eﬀect of the CPS redesign on rounding errors is less likely to alter
measured short-term and long-term unemployment rates. Interviewers are instructed
to ask for unemployment duration in weeks whenever a respondent reports a duration
of less than four months. To the extent that this is in fact done, all individuals should
10Baker (1992) discusses adjustments to reported unemployment durations to account for ‘digit
preference’, but his analysis — conducted before the CPS redesign — does not help with our problem,
the eﬀect of the redesign on reported unemployment duration.
14be correctly assigned to two key duration categories, 0 to 4 weeks and 5 to 14 weeks
(short- and medium-term unemployment). The number of spells that have lasted
more than 27 weeks, however, may be underestimated if some respondents report a
six-month (26-week) duration rather than a slightly higher number.11 We sidestep
this by extending the deﬁnition of long-term unemployment to include durations from
15 to 32 weeks, and thus deﬁne very long-term unemployment to include spells that
exceed 33 weeks.
To increase our conﬁdence that we are not missing some other important eﬀects
of the CPS redesign, we explore whether the relation between the incoming rotation
groups’ unemployment duration and other cyclic labor-market variables changed in
1994. For this to be a meaningful exercise, the other cyclic indicators must be ones
that were not themselves aﬀected by the CPS redesign. We focus on a measure of the
employment-population ratio constructed using employment from the BLS establish-
ment survey (the Current Employment Statistics, or CES, survey) and the Census
Bureau’s projection of the civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and older that
serves as the CPS control total. The employment-population ratio trends upward over
time, so we apply a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter to the time series.12 We similarly de-
trend the seasonally adjusted mean unemployment duration as well as the short-term
unemployment rate (0 to 4 week), the long-term unemployment rate (15 to 32 week),
and the very long-term unemployment rate (33 or more weeks) unemployment rates.13
11Note that this bias would tend to reduce the measured very long-term unemployment rate and
so in any case cannot explain the surprisingly high rates at the end of the 1990s noted in the
introduction.
12We set the smoothing parameter to 1,440,000, one hundred times larger than the standard
value with monthly data. This does a good job of capturing the low-frequency movements in the
various time series without erasing the cyclic variation. Lower values of the smoothing parameter
yield similar results. On the other hand, owing to its substantial upward trend during the sample
period, the raw time series for the employment-population ratio does a poor job of predicting the
unemployment rate.
13From 1968 to 1993, we calculate the numbers using a monthly time series containing the num-
ber of unemployed workers with each week’s duration, constructed by the BLS. After 1994, we
15There is a strong negative correlation between the employment-population ratio and
measures of longer-duration unemployment: −0.85 with the mean unemployment
duration; −0.89 with the long-term unemployment rate; and −0.90 with the very
long-term unemployment rate. The correlation with the short-term unemployment
rate is weaker but still negative (−0.55).
To test for a break in a CPS-based time series in January 1994, we regress the
series on the employment-population ratio using data from 1968 through 1993. We
then forecast the series from 1994 through 2000 and plot the residual forecast errors.
If there were a break in the time series, we would expect the residuals to look diﬀerent
after the break and, in particular, to jump in January 1994. The results are shown
in Figure 6. The regressions perform remarkably well out of the sample period. In
only one case, the very long-term unemployment rate, is there any indication of a
discontinuity in January 1994, and even then the change is not unusual by historical
standards. A reasonable measure of the possible eﬀect of the redesign is the mean
value of the residuals during the ﬁrst half of 1994.14 The unemployment rates show
no systematic pattern, with the short-term rate 0.02 percent below, the long-term
rate 0.13 percent below, and the very long-term rate 0.13 percent above the expected
levels, all small values given the pattern of variation in the residuals. The mean
unemployment duration is further from trend, 1.42 weeks above what one would
expect in the ﬁrst half of 1994, but that is not much diﬀerent than the deviation
in the last half of 1993, when it was 0.85 weeks above trend. Because the point
estimates are imprecise, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the CPS redesign
had no eﬀect on the measured mean unemployment duration in the incoming rotation
constructed our own time series from the CPS using only the incoming rotation groups. The data
are seasonally adjusted using a ratio-to-moving-average procedure. The required data are unavailable
before 1968.
14Filtering the data diminishes our ability to recognize redesign eﬀects many years after the
redesign. This should not be a problem during the ﬁrst year.
16groups.
In sum, although it had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the unemployment rate, the CPS
redesign indisputably aﬀected measured unemployment duration. Only the eﬀects
associated with the introduction of dependent interviewing can be identiﬁed with
conﬁdence, and we control for those in what follows. The results just discussed
suggest that the full eﬀect of the redesign on mean unemployment duration could have
been somewhat larger, but we have no strong empirical basis for making additional
adjustments and so choose not to do so. Figure 7 summarizes these ﬁndings, depicting
our preferred time series for mean unemployment duration and the short-, long-, and
very long-term unemployment rates, with the standard time series depicted as a
dashed line.15 While measurement issues explain much of the recent decline in the
short-term unemployment rate, they do not explain the persistently high level of very
long-term unemployment or mean unemployment duration.
4 Aging of the Baby Boom
The youth unemployment rate is much higher than the prime-age unemployment rate.
Viewing the aggregate unemployment rate as a weighted average of the unemployment
rate of workers in diﬀerent age cohorts, part of the recent decline in unemployment
may be attributed to a simple compositional eﬀect, a consequence of the aging of the
baby boom (Shimer 1998). What is true for the aggregate unemployment rate is even
15The standard time series diﬀer from our preferred time series before the CPS redesign as well as
after. The large diﬀerences in the long- and very long-term unemployment rates are due to diﬀerences
in deﬁnitions: the solid lines indicate the 15- to 32-week and 33 or more week unemployment rates,
while the dashed lines indicate the 15- to 26-week and 27 or more week unemployment rates. The
small diﬀerences in the mean unemployment duration and the short-term unemployment rate are due
to changes in population weights associated with the 1980 and 1990 census. In order to construct
the desired time series for the long- and very long-term unemployment rates, we had to use the
original weights based on the 1980 census, while the oﬃcial time series use adjusted weights based
on the 1990 census.
17more true for the short-term unemployment rate. Young workers rarely suﬀer long
spells of unemployment,16 so, from 1968 to 2000, the fraction of teenagers unemployed
for less than four weeks in a typical month was 6.5 times as high as the comparable
fraction of 35- to 54-year-old workers. The short-term unemployment rate for 20- to
24-year olds was 3.2 times as high, and for 25- to 34-year olds was 1.6 times as high.
Since 1980, the share of the labor force accounted for by 35- to 54-year-olds has risen
by 13.2 percent, mostly at the expense of younger workers. The aging of the baby-
boom generation during the last two decades has therefore shifted the population into
age groups that suﬀer fewer short unemployment spells.
Under the assumption that the aging of the baby boom has not aﬀected the unem-
ployment probability or unemployment duration of workers conditional on their age,
we can measure the eﬀect of this demographic transition on the overall unemploy-
ment rate, the short-, long-, and very long-term unemployment rates, and the mean
duration of unemployment. To illustrate, let ui,t denote the unemployment rate of age
group i in year t and ωi,t denote the labor force share of that age group in the same
year. Then the unemployment rate is just a weighted average of the unemployment
rates of workers of diﬀerent ages,
 N
i=1 ωi,tui,t, where N is the number of age groups.17




i=1 ωi,sui,t if the labor-force shares had remained at their year-s
levels. We refer to this as the age-adjusted unemployment rate. Similar calculations
can be carried out for the other variables of interest. To apply this procedure, we
must select a base year s. To the extent that the diﬀerences across age groups in the
16This is partly because of how unemployment duration is measured. Young workers who do not
have a job often engage in periodic job search, thus moving in and out of the labor force (Clark and
Summers 1982).
17We use the N = 7 “standard” age groups — 16-19, 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and
over 65 — for these calculations. In practice, further reﬁnements have little eﬀect on demographic
adjustments.
18unemployment rates ui,t are stable from one year to the next, as is generally the case,
the choice of base year is of no real consequence. In what follows, we consistently use
1980 as the base year for our age adjustments, but we have obtained similar results
with other base years.
Figure 8 shows the eﬀects of age adjustments on the overall unemployment rate.
As documented in Shimer (1998), the age-adjusted unemployment rate has been
higher relative to rates observed in the past than has the unadjusted rates more
commonly the focus of attention. Between 1980 and 1992, 0.67 percentage points
of the decline in the aggregate unemployment rate could be attributed to the aging
of the baby boom. Some of this trend has been reversed in the last few years, but,
comparing across business-cycle peaks, the aging of the baby boom contributed to a
0.21 percentage point increase in the aggregate unemployment rate from 1969 to 1979,
a 0.44 percentage point decline over the next decade, and a further 0.14 percentage
point decline from 1989 to 2000.18
The age-related decline in unemployment has been concentrated at the short end
of the unemployment-duration spectrum. Figure 9 shows that the age-adjusted short-
term unemployment rate was 2.1 percent in 1969 and 2.5 percent in 1973 but that
it has not subsequently fallen back to these historic lows. In contrast, age-adjusted
mean unemployment duration has increased modestly from expansion to expansion
during the last three decades. The age-adjusted long-term unemployment rate has
declined somewhat during the 1980s and 1990s, but the age-adjusted very long-term
unemployment rate has not declined at all. Taking the movements in overall unem-
18Whether this demographic adjustment is quantitatively signiﬁcant is a matter for debate. Within
this volume, Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2001)a n dBlank and Shapiro (2001) emphasize demographic
trends, but Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001) argue that demographics are unimportant for un-
derstanding recent shifts in the Phillips curve, and Cohen, Dickens, and Posen (2001) claim that
demographics cannot explain sudden sharp jumps in the Beveridge curve. Our view is that demo-
graphic trends are important for understanding shifts beginning in 1980 but not very important for
changes during the last decade.
19ployment shown in Figure 8 and the movements in the duration measures shown in
Figure 9 together, neither our measurement adjustments nor our age-structure ad-
justments alter the qualitative conclusion that long-duration unemployment has been
high in recent years compared to the aggregate unemployment rate.
5 Labor Force Attachment
5.1 Women’s and Men’s Labor Market Outcomes
Our analysis so far has ignored an important factor in determining labor-market
outcomes, the worker’s sex. From 1965 through 1979, women’s age-adjusted unem-
ployment rate was on average nearly two percentage points higher than men’s rate
(Figure 10). Since then, the two rates have converged, with an average diﬀerence from
1980 to 2000 of less than 0.1 percentage point, although women’s unemployment rate
has been somewhat less variable than men’s at business-cycle frequencies. Given the
close link between the unemployment rate and unemployment duration, one might
expect that men’s and women’s age-adjusted unemployment durations would also
have tracked each other quite closely since 1980. Figures 11 and 12, which graph
men’s and women’s age-adjusted mean unemployment duration and short-, long-,
and very long-term unemployment rates, show that this has not been the case. Men
have consistently experienced much less short-term unemployment than have women
and hence have had a much longer mean unemployment duration. This observation
enables us to reﬁne our understanding of the unemployment-duration puzzle.
Men’s unemployment rate and unemployment duration have had a relatively stable
relation during the past three decades (Figure 11). After accounting for age, men’s
unemployment rate reached 3.0 percent at the end of the 1960s before rising to 5.1
20percent in 1979 and 5.6 percent in 1989. By 2000, it had fallen to 4.4 percent, which is
by no means an unprecedented level. Likewise, men’s mean unemployment duration
rose from 8.3 weeks in 1969 to over 12 weeks in 1979, where it has remained during
subsequent expansions. Looking at means masks a signiﬁcant secular increase in men’s
short-term unemployment rate, which has been oﬀset by an increase in the prevalence
of very long-term unemployment. Given these changes, male unemployment is higher
at both extremes of the unemployment-duration distribution than would have been
expected given the level of the aggregate unemployment rate, all after adjustment
for measurement and age-structure changes. This “bimodality” is consistent with
the growing dispersion of labor-market outcomes documented in other contexts, for
example, the growth in the dispersion of labor-market earnings (Katz and Murphy
1992). It would be interesting to ﬁnd out whether the increasing concentration of male
unemployment at the short and long ends of the unemployment-duration spectrum
can be explained in a similar manner.
In contrast, women’s age-adjusted unemployment rate is at the lowest level since
the 1950s, having fallen from 6.8 percent during the expansion at the end of the 1970s,
to 5.8 percent during the 1980s expansion, to 4.7 percent by the end of the 1990s.
Figure 12 shows that there has not been any drop in women’s age-adjusted unem-
ployment duration during this time period. Instead, women’s mean unemployment
duration increased from 9.5 weeks in 1979 and 9.4 weeks in 1989 to 11.0 weeks in
1990, primarily a consequence of a sharp drop in women’s short-term unemployment
rate and a sustained high level in women’s very long-term unemployment rate. The
historic link between women’s unemployment rate and women’s unemployment du-
ration broke down during the 1980s and 1990s, and measurement and demographics
do not explain why.
One hint is that, in all cases, men’s and women’s unemployment durations have
21converged toward a common level. Our ﬁrst thought was that this pattern might be
linked to changes in the industry and occupation distribution of women’s employment,
but further investigation showed that unemployment durations do not diﬀer enough
across these categories to explain the increase in women’s unemployment duration.
Instead, we explore another big shift that has occurred during the last two decades,
the increase in women’s attachment to the labor force.
5.2 Labor-Market Transitions
To understand labor-market attachment, we must analyze not only transitions be-
tween employment (E) and unemployment (U) but also movements in and out of
the labor force (N). We construct a time series for women’s and men’s age-adjusted
labor-market-transition rates following the methodology discussed in Appendix B and
display them in Figure 13. These data are available for the period from 1976 through
2000. The ﬁrst thing that stands out in this ﬁgure is that, for both men and women,
the transition probability from E to U (hereafter the EU transition rate λeu,w i t h
similar notation for the other transition rates) and the NU transition rate λnu are
at their lowest levels in twenty-ﬁve years, while the UE transition rate λue is at its
highest level. In an accounting sense, this is a major part of the explanation for
the current low level of unemployment. In comparing women’s and men’s transition
rates, there is no evidence of convergence in λeu or λue, but the remaining four tran-
sition rates, which all involve the labor-market-participation decision, have steadily
converged during the past twenty-ﬁve years. Women are now much less likely to exit
the labor market directly from employment, a sign of increased attachment, while
men have become somewhat more likely to exit the labor market from unemployment
and less likely to reenter the labor force once they leave it, two signs of decreased
22labor force attachment.
Next, we show how to use the transition data to construct measures of the ag-
gregate unemployment rate and the short-term unemployment rate. Recall that any
Markov transition matrix implies a unique steady-state distribution of workers across
the three labor-market states E, U, and N, given by the appropriately normalized
eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue of one:
e = k
 








λueλen + λeuλun + λenλun
 
where e denotes the fraction of the population that is employed, u the fraction that is
unemployed, and n the fraction that is not in the labor force, and k is a proportionality
constant that ensures e + u + n = 1. From this distribution, we can calculate the
“implied steady-state unemployment rate” u/(e + u). Of course, there is no reason
to believe that the economy must always be in steady state or, equivalently, that
the actual unemployment rate equals the implied unemployment rate. But the top
row of Figure 14 documents that, in practice, the implied unemployment rate does
a remarkable job of tracking the actual age-adjusted unemployment rate both for
women and for men. The mean absolute diﬀerence between the two time series is
0.14 percentage points for women and 0.17 percentage points for men.
We can also use the labor-market-ﬂow data to construct a measure of the short-
term unemployment rate. A fraction λue + λun of unemployed workers exit unem-
ployment in an average month and, in steady-state, this must equal the fraction of
unemployed workers who are in their ﬁrst month of unemployment. The product of
this and the unemployment rate implied by the labor-market-transition rates should,
23therefore, give us an independent measure of the short-term unemployment rate. The
bottom row of Figure 14 shows that the implied measure of short-term unemployment
is on average about half a percentage point below the standard time series. The most
plausible interpretation of this result harks back to our analysis of the eﬀect of the
CPS redesign on the measured unemployment rate. Recall that the incoming rotation
groups report almost half a percentage point more short-term unemployment than did
the full CPS in post-1994 data. This reﬂects the switch to dependent interviewing,
with the result that a worker who is unemployed in consecutive months cannot report
less than a ﬁve-week unemployment duration in the second month. Our construction
of the short-term unemployment rate from labor market ﬂow data is analogous to the
switch to dependent interviewing since a worker who is unemployed in consecutive
months cannot be counted as short-term unemployed. This suggests that our time se-
ries for short-term unemployment is internally consistent but that it does not measure
the same quantity as the short-term unemployment rate reported elsewhere in the pa-
per. Rather, it measures something more like what the redesigned CPS measures for
workers who are not in the incoming rotation groups. This view is also quantitatively
reasonable. The gap between the short-term unemployment rate constructed using
transition data and the actual rate averaged 0.69 percentage point between 1994 and
2000, while the short term unemployment rate for the incoming rotation group was
on average 0.63 percentage point lower than the short term unemployment rate in
the other rotation groups over the same time period.19
In any case, the basic puzzle of women’s unemployment duration remains in the
time series implied by labor-market-transition rates: women’s implied unemployment
19We do not have a good explanation for the widening gap between men’s implied and actual
short-term unemployment rates after 1994, but we do not believe that this is a redesign eﬀect. The
gap has grown slowly over time, while we would expect a redesign eﬀect to have emerged suddenly
in 1994.
24rate fell from 7.0 percent in 1979 to 4.6 percent in 2000, a decline of 33 percent. Under
ordinary circumstances, we would expect this to be reﬂected almost exclusively in
declines at longer unemployment durations. But, instead, women’s implied short-term
unemployment rate fell from 2.8 to 2.0 percent during the same time period, a decline
of 29 percent. In contrast, men’s implied unemployment rate fell by half as much,
16 percent, over the same time period, while their implied short-term unemployment
rate fell by just 7 percent.20
To see whether this is related to the increase in women’s labor-force attachment
(or to the decrease in men’s labor-force attachment), we conduct a counterfactual
exercise whereby we “shut down” changes in the transitions between various labor-
market states in turn. For example, we take women’s actual λue and λeu time series
but ﬁx the other four transition rates at their 1979 level.21 Using the constructed
sequence of Markov matrices, we calculate the implied aggregate and short-term un-
employment rates. We perform similar counterfactual experiments by allowing for
time-variation only in λun and λnu and similarly for time-variation only in λen and
λne. By plotting the resulting time series, we can see which of the changes in tran-
sition rates are important for understanding the secular variation in aggregate and
short-term unemployment rates.
Consider ﬁrst women’s aggregate unemployment, depicted in the top left panel
of Figure 15. The solid line shows the persistent decline in women’s implied age-
adjusted unemployment rate. The remaining lines indicate the contribution of the
20Our choice of base year aﬀects these numbers — particularly for men, who suﬀered a sharp
increase in unemployment in 1980 — but not the qualitative result that the decline in women’s
unemployment has been registered disproportionately at short unemployment durations. From 1980
to 2000, men’s unemployment rate fell by 41 percent, and men’s short-term unemployment rate fell
by 26 percent. The decline in women’s unemployment rate was smaller (39 percent), but the decline
in their short-term unemployment rate was larger (32 percent) over that time period.
21Our exercise is similar in spirit to Pissarides (1986), who examines the contribution of increases
in λeu and decreases in λue to the increase in British unemployment during the 1970s and early
1980s.
25three other pairs of transition rates. Changes in λun and λnu are not particularly im-
portant for understanding the decline in women’s unemployment rate, although they
do help explain some of the business-cycle ﬂuctuations in the rate. Not surprisingly,
the increase in λue and the decrease in λeu reduced the incidence of female unemploy-
ment, and their ﬂuctuations are also important contributors to short-run variation
in the unemployment rate. But the most surprising ﬁnding is the equally important
contribution of changes in ﬂows between E and N, with both the decrease in λen and
the increase in λne contributing to the secular reduction in women’s unemployment.
This ﬁnding is even more apparent when we look at the counterfactual time series
for women’s short-term unemployment rate in the bottom left panel of Figure 15.
Over half the trend decline is explained by changes in λen and λne, much more than
changes in the other transition rates can explain. The sharp decline in λen for women
presumably reﬂects an increase in their attachment to the labor market. It was much
less common for a woman to quit her job and exit the labor force in the 1990s than it
was two decades earlier. To the extent that this implies that women today are better
able to build long-term employment relations, the decline in women’s unemployment
rate is readily understandable. Worker-ﬂow data give a unique perspective on this
fact.
Performing a similar experiment with men’s unemployment rates highlights the
importance of labor force attachment (right panels of Figure 15). The increase in
λen for men has raised men’s unemployment rate by over half a percentage point
and men’s short-term unemployment rate by over 0.2 percentage point. Variations in
the other transition rates are responsible for the observed decline in unemployment.
Again, it is not surprising that the decrease in λeu and the increase in λue reduced
unemployment, although it is curious that these variables are responsible for virtually
all the cyclic ﬂuctuations in men’s aggregate and short-term unemployment rate. In
26contrast, for women, λnu and λun also contribute signiﬁcantly to the cyclic movements
in employment. More interesting is that the decline in λnu is equally important for
understanding male unemployment. This reﬂects the well-known decrease in men’s
labor-market-participation rate over this time period (Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991)
and provides some justiﬁcation for the belief that the current low levels of unemploy-
ment in the United States are at least partially a consequence of the decline in men’s
participation rate.
To summarize the importance of labor-force attachment, it is easiest to focus on
what would have happened had there been no change in the ﬂows in and out of the
labor market, only in λeu and λue. Between 1979 and 2000, women’s unemployment
rate would have fallen by 16 percent (from 7.0 to 5.8 percent of the labor force),
rather than by 33 percent (to 4.6 percent of the labor force), while their short-term
unemployment rate would have fallen by only 7 percent, rather than by 29 percent. In
contrast, over the same time period, men’s unemployment rate would have fallen by
12 percent, rather than by 16 percent with all ﬂow-rate changes taken into account,
while their short-term unemployment rate would have fallen by 8 percent, rather
than by 7 percent. This suggests that, in the absence of changes in labor-force
attachment, men’s unemployment duration would have increased relative to women’s
over this period. Conversely, it suggests that changes in labor-force attachment are
responsible for the observed increase in women’s unemployment duration relative to
their unemployment rate during the last two decades.
6 Conclusion
This paper started with the observation that there has been a breakdown in the
historic relation between the unemployment rate and unemployment duration. We
27then showed that, for men, much of the relative increase in unemployment duration
can be explained by measurement issues related to the 1994 CPS redesign and by the
aging of the baby boom. For women, however, these two factors do not have much
explanatory power. Instead, we used labor-market-transition rates to show that much
of the decline in women’s unemployment rate since the late 1970s is due to the increase
in their attachment to the labor force and that this likewise explains why the decline
has been concentrated at the short end of the unemployment-duration distribution.
There are reasons to believe that this process is coming to an end. Women’s and
men’s labor-market experiences have become much more similar and, in particular,
their labor market transition rates are converging towards a common level.
The increase in women’s labor-force attachment has manifested itself in a variety
of other ways. Periodic job-tenure supplements to the CPS indicate that, after ac-
counting for the aging of the labor force, the fraction of employed women who have
worked in one job for at least ten years increased from 25 to 27 percent between
1983 and 2000. Over the same time period, the age-adjusted fraction of employed
men in the same job actually fell, from 39 to 32 percent (Figure 16). Many authors
have linked the changing occupation distribution of female employment to the in-
creased likelihood that women will be continuously employed, arguing that women
who expect to be in the labor market for an extended period are more likely to ﬁnd
it attractive to enter occupations requiring substantial on-the-job training. Similarly,
to the extent that employers bear the costs of job training, they may be more likely
to consider women for such jobs when they believe that their tenure will be longer
(Blau and Kahn 2000). Moreover, as shown by Blau and Kahn (1997)a n dO’Neill
and Polachek (1993), increases in working women’s job experience as compared to
men’s have contributed substantially to the narrowing of the gap between men’s and
women’s earnings. The labor-market-transition rate data that we have examined
28indicate that the growing stability of women’s employment relations is also central
to understanding why women’s aggregate and short-term unemployment rates have
declined while women’s unemployment duration has increased. Conversely, men’s
weakening labor-force attachment appears to be important for understanding the rel-
atively high levels of aggregate and short-term unemployment for men. Although the
trend towards declining male labor-force participation has abated in recent years, its
resumption would exacerbate these eﬀects.
29Appendix
A. Parallel-Survey Analysis of the CPS Redesign
Polivka and Miller (1998) provide a comprehensive and careful analysis of a parallel
survey that was designed to assess the eﬀects of the CPS redesign. From July 1992
through December 1993, the parallel survey sample was administered the redesigned
CPS instrument. From January 1994 through May 1994, the parallel survey sample
was administered the old, pencil-and-paper CPS instrument. With appropriate iden-
tifying assumptions, estimates based on the parallel survey can be used in conjunction
with those from the oﬃcial CPS to assess the eﬀect of the CPS redesign on various
variables of interest.
Polivka and Miller select the following as their preferred speciﬁcation for assessing
the eﬀects of the CPS redesign:
Yit = µt + δppit + δmmit + εit (1)
where Yit is the variable to be estimated, pit is a dummy variable that equals 1 for
parallel survey estimates and 0 for oﬃcial CPS estimates, mit is a dummy variable
that equals 1 for estimates based on data collected using the new CPS methodology
and 0 for estimates based on data collected using the old CPS methodology, εit is
the equation error, the µt are time period eﬀects, and δp and δm are parameters to
be estimated. We are particularly interested in δm, which is intended to capture
the magnitude of the eﬀect of the redesign on the measured value of the dependent
variable Yit. Polivka and Miller ﬁt the model using estimates for the period October
1992 through May 1994 derived from both the parallel survey and the oﬃcial CPS.
30Note that this speciﬁcation allows estimates based on parallel survey data to diﬀer
from estimates based on data collected using the same methods as part of the oﬃcial
CPS, but identiﬁes the parallel survey eﬀect by constraining it to be the same before
and after January 1994.22
Using this methodology, Polivka and Miller conclude that the redesign did not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the unemployment rate, although they estimate a signiﬁcant par-
allel survey eﬀect δp.F i g u r e17 plots seasonally-adjusted versions of the unadjusted
series Polivka and Miller use to ﬁt their unemployment rate model.23 As is true of
the unadjusted data, the parallel survey unemployment estimates exceed the CPS es-
timates in all months. Had the higher parallel survey rates observed prior to January
1994 represented a redesign eﬀect, the parallel survey and the CPS lines should have
crossed between December 1993 and January 1994, as the parallel survey estimate
fell and the CPS estimate rose.
We use similar models to investigate the eﬀect of the redesign on the short-term
(0- to 4-week), long-term (15- to 26-week) and very long-term (27 or more weeks)
unemployment rates. The estimated values of associated with these three dependent
variables imply that the redesign reduced the measured short-term unemployment
rate by 0.46 percentage point; raised the long-term unemployment rate by 0.17 per-
centage point; and raised the very long-term unemployment rate by 0.25 percentage
point. Application of the model to assess the eﬀect of the redesign on the mean
22The speciﬁcation shown in equation (1) treats the CPS redesign eﬀect as additive. Polivka and
Miller also estimate models in which the CPS redesign eﬀect is treated as multiplicative. The same
general comments would apply to both models and the qualitative conclusions to be drawn from
them are similar.
23Because only 20 months of parallel survey data are available, it was not possible to construct
seasonal factors directly from the parallel survey time series. Instead, we apply multiplicative sea-
sonal factors based on oﬃcial CPS data to adjust the parallel survey data, and then use these
seasonally-adjusted estimates throughout in what follows. Although the CPS seasonal factors cap-
ture the seasonal movements in the parallel survey data imperfectly, this imperfect adjustment helps
to highlight the nonseasonal movements in which we are interested. None of our conclusions are
aﬀected by the use of adjusted rather than unadjusted data.
31duration of unemployment (in weeks) yields an estimated value for δm of 2.37.
An examination of the data underlying these estimates leaves us comfortable with
the conclusion regarding the impact of the redesign on the incidence of short-duration
unemployment, but raises questions about the implied impact on the other unem-
ployment duration measures. The four panels of Figure 18 plot the parallel survey
values and the corresponding oﬃcial CPS values used to estimate each of the four
unemployment duration models.24 The top right panel, which shows the short-term
unemployment rate, looks exactly as one might have expected. The parallel survey
short-term unemployment rate jumps upward at the point of transition from the new
to the old survey protocol, consistent with the expectation that the new survey pro-
tocol should have reduced the number of people reporting unemployment spells of
0 to 4 weeks duration. Presumably because the eﬀects of dependent interviewing in
the new protocol are not felt until the second month a person is interviewed, the
corresponding drop in the oﬃcial CPS estimates of the incidence of short-duration
unemployment follows with a one month lag. The decrease in the CPS short-term un-
employment rate is accompanied by a roughly oﬀsetting increase in the 5- to 14-week
unemployment rate series (not shown in the ﬁgure), although there is no oﬀsetting
decrease in the corresponding series in the parallel survey.
The bottom left panel displays the long-term (15- to 26-week) unemployment rate
series calculated using data from the two surveys. Consistent with the existence of a
redesign eﬀect on these data, the parallel survey and oﬃcial CPS estimates move in
opposite directions between December 1993 and January 1994. On the other hand, the
large swings in the gap between the two series during both the pre-transition period
and the post-transition period seem inconsistent with the simple model hypothesized
by Polivka and Miller, raising questions about its applicability.
24We are grateful to Anne Polivka for making the data that underlie these ﬁgures available to us.
32We are most troubled by the plot of mean unemployment duration in the top left
panel and the plot of the very long-term unemployment rate in the bottom right panel.
A redesign eﬀect should produce opposing movements in the parallel survey and the
oﬃcial CPS data. Instead, at the point of transition between survey protocols, there
is a sharp drop in the two parallel survey series, while the two oﬃcial CPS series
remain essentially unchanged.
In principle, declines in the true level of mean unemployment duration and the
true incidence of very long-term unemployment between December 1993 and January
1994 could be responsible for this pattern. Such declines would have magniﬁed the
negative measurement eﬀect of moving to the old methodology in the parallel survey
and masked the positive measurement eﬀect of moving to the new methodology in
the oﬃcial CPS. In practice, however, movements of the necessary magnitude are
implausibly large. The December 1993-January 1994 drop in (seasonally adjusted)
mean unemployment duration implied by our estimates of the Polivka-Miller model
is 2.24 weeks.25 To put this in context, the standard deviation of the month-to-
month change in the oﬃcial seasonally adjusted CPS mean unemployment duration
series is just 0.52 weeks and the largest absolute change ever observed over the 1948
to 2000 period is only 1.9 weeks. The corresponding implied drop in the very long-
term unemployment rate is 0.33 percentage point. The month-to-month change in the
oﬃcial CPS very long-term unemployment rate series has a standard deviation of just
0.06 percentage point and the largest post-1948 absolute change in the same series is
only 0.26 percentage point. In contrast, the implied December-1993-to-January-1994
movements in both the short-term and the long-term unemployment rates are well
within those series’ one-standard-deviation bounds.
25This is calculated as the diﬀerence between the January 1994 and the December 1993 µt values
in the speciﬁcation shown in equation (1).
33One possible explanation is that the post-January 1994 parallel survey did not
yield unemployment duration estimates fully comparable to those that continuation
of the old pencil-and-paper CPS would have produced. There are some notewor-
thy diﬀerences in how the two surveys were administered. Fewer than half of the
interviewers for the parallel survey from January 1994 forward had any prior ex-
perience with the pencil-and-paper instrument. In addition, a substantial share of
the post-January 1994 parallel survey interviewers had recent experience with the
computerized CPS instrument, which could have contaminated the responses they
collected to the questions on the old CPS in unknown ways. This may have been
less of an issue with the core CPS questions on which interviewer training presum-
ably concentrated, but could have been a more important issue with the questions
on unemployment duration. Although it is diﬃcult to say exactly how these or other
diﬀerences might have aﬀected the survey estimates, it is well known that seemingly
minor diﬀerences in survey administration can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect.26 A further
consideration is that, as compared to many of the other labor market variables for
which Polivka and Miller report redesign eﬀects, the sample sizes underlying all of
the unemployment duration estimates are very small, and the estimates of mean un-
employment duration, in particular, are unusually susceptible to outliers. Because
we are not fully comfortable with using the parallel survey data to identify how the
redesign aﬀected the unemployment duration estimates, especially the estimates for
mean unemployment duration and the incidence of very long-term unemployment,
we pursue a diﬀerent approach to measuring redesign eﬀects in the text.
26BLS-Census (1993) discusses a number of diﬀerences between the pre-January-1994 CPS and
the post-January-1994 parallel survey that could have produced diﬀerences in the resulting esti-
mates. This document also contains information on the projected mix of parallel survey interviewer
experience that has been cited by other authors (for example, Polivka and Miller 1998) but turns
out not to match the actual mix. The information on interviewer mix we cite was provided by Ron
Tucker of the Census Bureau.
34B. Construction of Worker Transition Data
Measures of worker transitions take advantage of the rotating-panel aspect of the CPS
by matching workers’ labor-market states across months. This requires access to the
CPS public-use microdata, which we have only since 1976. Furthermore, there are a
few months when we are not able to match workers across months because of survey
redesigns or conﬁdentiality suppressions in the available public-use data ﬁles.27 We
use the matched worker data to construct the probability that a worker who is in
labor-market state X in month t − 1 is in state Y in month t, the XY transition rate
in month t or, equivalently, λxy. Although this is the standard measure of worker
transitions in the United States, it is important to recognize that it has a number
of shortcomings. First, it is relatively noisy. In any month, three-quarters of the
CPS households were in the CPS in the previous month and, theoretically, should
be matchable. Because of sample attrition, including individuals who move between
sample months and therefore are no longer eligible to be interviewed, and mistakes
in recording data elements such as age or sex that are essential to the matching
algorithm, matched ﬁles in practice contain about 70 percent of the observations
in the unmatched ﬁles.28 But, since some labor-market transitions (for example,
men’s UN transitions) are relatively rare, they cannot be estimated very precisely,
particularly for small demographic groups. We boost our sample size by working with
27We used a household identiﬁer, individual line number, race, sex, and age in our matching
algorithm. The values for each of these variables were required to be the same in month t and
month t − 1, except that we also accepted a value for age in month t equal to one more than the
value in month t − 1. The months for which matches could not be constructed due to redesigns
or suppressions are January 1978, July 1985, October 1985, January 1994, and June - October
1995. In addition, matched data are unavailable for January 1976 since we do not have the required
“last-month” ﬁle, December 1975.
28This implies that about 7 percent of the eligible observations (5/75) cannot be matched across
months, signiﬁcantly less than the 15 percent reported by Abowd and Zellner (1985). The source of
the diﬀerence is unclear, but it seems unlikely that we are matching observations that should not be
matched. Our matching algorithm yields transition rates that are almost identical to those computed
by the BLS, while one would expect over-matching to yield additional erroneous transitions.
35annual average data.
Perhaps more important, some fraction of measured transitions are spurious. A
misreported labor-market status in one month generates two erroneous transitions.
In a careful analysis of data from 1977 to 1982, Abowd and Zellner (1985) estimate
that as many as 40 percent of labor-force transitions are spurious. Unfortunately,
Abowd and Zellner’s analysis has not been replicated using more recent data, and
to do so would go well beyond the scope of our analysis. As a consequence, we do
not know whether the spurious transition rate has increased or decreased over time.
With no contradictory evidence, we assume that the bias in estimated transitions is
unchanged over time, so we adjust our estimated labor-force-transition rates using
the percentage changes in table 5 of Abowd and Zellner (1985), in particular, the
column labeled Classiﬁcation & Margin Error to Unadjusted.
The 1994 CPS redesign may have aﬀected the measured exit rate of unemployed
workers from the labor force. There is no obvious reason why this should be so, but
an examination of the time series of labor-market transitions indicates an unusually
large and persistent increase in λun between December 1993 and February 1994. To
get at this more precisely, we regress each detrended labor-market-transition series
on the detrended CES employment-population ratio and look at the residuals for
evidence of a break in the normal relation between worker transitions and the state of
the business cycle, exactly as in our analysis of the eﬀect of the redesign on measures
of unemployment duration. Figure 19 graphically displays the results for the six
transition rates. λun takes a signiﬁcant jump, with the residual increasing from −0.6
percent in December 1993 to 0.9 percent in February 1994 and then further increasing
during the next six months. Comparing the last six months of 1993 to the ﬁrst
six available months of 1994 (February to July), the average value of the residual
increases by a full 3.15 percentage points, twice as large as any comparable change in
36the residual.29 Although it is conceivable that this represents a structural shift in the
relation between λun and the employment-population ratio, we feel fairly conservative
in reducing λun by 3.15 percentage points after 1994. Since there is no evidence of a
change in λue, we oﬀset this with an increase in the probability that an unemployed
worker remains unemployed.
Figure 19 suggests that λnu may also have increased with the redesign, although
the absolute size of the jump is smaller. The six-month change in the residual peaks
at about 0.34 percent in January 1994, ﬁfty percent larger than any other comparable
change, and slightly more than one-tenth of the estimated size of the λun residual.
Although the evidence here is somewhat weaker than it is for λun, the ﬁnding is
consistent with Polivka and Miller’s (1998) evidence that the CPS redesign did not
aﬀect the measured stock of workers in each employment state. To understand why,
observe that the worker-transition data imply a unique steady-state distribution of

















































where e denotes the fraction of the population that is employed, u the fraction that
is unemployed, and n the fraction that is not in the labor force. The transition
matrix is Markov, with columns summing to 1, so has one eigenvalue equal to 1.
The solution to these equations is therefore given by the eigenvector associated with
that eigenvalue. Moreover, for any change in λun to ˆ λun accompanied by a change
in λuu that keeps the matrix Markov, it is possible to ﬁnd a change in λnu together
29The residual gradually reverts to zero over the next three years. This is because we are examining
the relationship between detrended time series. Eventually, the trend catches up with and erases
any eﬀects of the CPS redesign.
37with an appropriate change in λnn that generates the same ergodic distribution of
workers across employment states, that is, a change in λnu to ˆ λnu that solves λeu ×
e + ˆ λuu × u + ˆ λnu × n = u, together with a change in λnn that keeps the transition
matrix Markov. Since accounting for the CPS redesign raises our measure of λuu by
3.15 percentage points but should not have aﬀected the overall unemployment rate, it
must reduce our measure of λnu by 3.15×u/n percentage points. With the number of
unemployed persons averaging approximately one-ninth of the not-in-the-labor-force
population during the past several years, this is almost perfectly consistent with our
independent ﬁnding that the CPS redesign has increased the measured value of λnu
by 0.34 percentage points from 1994 to 2000. A similar analysis ﬁnds no evidence
of changes in any of the other transitions, so we account for the CPS redesign by
reducing λun by 3.15 percentage points and raising λnu by 0.34 percentage points
throughout our analysis.
We use this methodology to construct separate transition rates for women and
men in the usual seven age groups. We then aggregate these into time series for
women’s and men’s age-adjusted transition rates, weighting λxy for age group i by
the share of age group i in the initial labor-market state X in the base year 1980.
Finally, we adjust the data according to Table 5 in Abowd and Zellner (1985).30 We
then test and do not reject the hypothesis that the CPS redesign had the same eﬀect
on age-adjusted values of λun and λnu for men and women as it did on the aggregate
transition rates, so we subtract 3.15 and 0.34 percentage points, respectively, from
these transition rates after 1994.31
30Abowd and Zellner report three diﬀerent adjustments — for “all persons”, “male,” and “female”.
The numbers that we report use the “all persons” adjustment because the available evidence suggests
a convergence between men’s and women’s behavior since 1981, the end of the period that Abowd
and Zellner study. In practice, this choice has little eﬀect on our conclusions.
31These numbers are consistent with Frazis (1996), who, using an entirely diﬀerent methodology,
concluded that the CPS redesign raised λun by at least 2.8 percentage points and λnu by about 0.4
percentage points.
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Figure 1: Monthly ﬂuctuations were smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with
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Aggregate Unemployment Duration and Rates
Figure 2: The top left panel shows the mean duration of unemployment spells cur-
rently in progress. The remaining panels show the share of the labor force with 0 to
4, 15 to 26, and 27 or more weeks unemployment duration (short-term, long-term,
and very long-term unemployment rates, respectively). The dashed line in each panel
shows the aggregate unemployment rate on a diﬀerent scale. Monthly ﬂuctuations
were smoothed using an Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with parameter 10. Data are from
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Unemployment Duration in Weeks
Figure 3: This ﬁgure shows the average probability of an unemployed worker becoming
employed in the following month as a function of her unemployment duration, 1976
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Index of Unemployment Pressure
Figure 4: This ﬁgure shows the index of unemployment pressure (the solid line) and
the normalized unemployment rate (the dashed line). The deﬁnition of the index of
unemployment pressure is given in the text. The unemployment rate is normalized
so it has the same average value as the index of unemployment pressure. Monthly
ﬂuctuations were smoothed using an Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with parameter 10. Data


























































































































































































































































































































Unemployment Duration CDFs: Incoming Rotation Group minus Full Sample
Figure 5: The diﬀerence between the cumulative distribution of unemployment dura-
tions for individuals in the ﬁrst and ﬁfth months in the sample compared to the entire
survey sample in the four years before and the seven years since the CPS redesign.
Figures are annual averages. The cumulative distribution is the fraction of unem-
ployed workers with unemployment duration less than or equal to x weeks. Data are
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Residual Unemployment Duration and Rates
Figure 6: Residuals from regressions of the detrended mean unemployment duration,
short-term unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate, and very long-term
unemployment rate on the detrended employment-population ratio. The employ-
ment level in the latter ratio comes from the Current Employment Statistics (CES)
survey. The population is the over-16 population used by the CPS. We computed
the dependent variables from the CPS. They are seasonally adjusted using a ratio
to moving average procedure. For 1994 through 2000, only the incoming rotation
groups are included. All series are detrended using an HP ﬁlter with smoothing pa-
rameter 1,440,000, which eliminates only very low frequency ﬂuctuations. Vertical
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Unemployment Duration and Rates Adjusted for Measurement Changes
Figure 7: The top left panel shows the mean duration of unemployment spells cur-
rently in progress. The remaining panels show the share of the labor force with 0 to
4, 15 to 32, and 33 or more weeks unemployment duration (short-term, long-term,
and very long-term unemployment rates, respectively). We constructed the solid line
in each panel from the CPS, except for values before 1975, which are constructed
from BLS weekly unemployment-duration data. From 1994 to 2000, the time series
use only the incoming rotation groups. The dashed line indicates the corresponding
oﬃcial time series, with long-term unemployment deﬁned as 15 to 26 weeks and very




















Figure 8: This ﬁgure shows the unemployment rate adjusted for measurement changes
and changes in the age composition of the labor force (the solid line) and unemploy-
ment rate adjusted only for measurement changes (the dashed line). Data are from


























































1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000









Age-Adjusted Unemployment Duration and Rates
Figure 9: The top left panel shows the mean duration of unemployment spells cur-
rently in progress. The remaining panels show the share of the labor force with 0 to
4, 15 to 32, and 33 or more weeks unemployment duration (short-term, long-term,
and very long-term unemployment rates, respectively). The solid line in each panel
shows measurement- and age-adjusted time series, while the dashed line indicates the
series adjusted only for measurement changes (see Figure 7). The time series from
1968 through 1975 were constructed using unpublished BLS data; information on the
number of people unemployed 15 to 32 and 33 plus weeks was not available by age.
From 1976 forward, the time series were constructed directly from the CPS. From
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Figure 10: Unemployment data are from the oﬃcial Bureau of Labor Statistics time
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Age-Adjusted Unemployment Duration and Rates: Men
Figure 11: The top left panel shows the measurement- and age-adjusted mean du-
ration of unemployment spells currently in progress for men. The remaining panels
show the similarly adjusted shares of men in the labor force with 0 to 4, 15 to 32,
and 33 or more weeks unemployment duration (short-term, long-term, and very long-
term unemployment rates, respectively). The dashed line in each panel shows men’s
adjusted unemployment rate on a diﬀerent scale. Unemployment data are from the
oﬃcial Bureau of Labor Statistics time series and our calculations. Duration data
from 1968 through 1975 were constructed using unpublished BLS data; information
on the number of people unemployed 15 to 32 and 33 or more weeks was not available
by age. From 1976 forward, the time series were constructed directly from the CPS.
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Age-Adjusted Unemployment Duration and Rates: Women
Figure 12: The top left panel shows the measurement- and age-adjusted mean dura-
tion of unemployment spells currently in progress for women. The remaining panels
show the similarly adjusted shares of women in the labor force with 0 to 4, 15 to
32, and 33 or more weeks unemployment duration (short-term, long-term, and very
long-term unemployment rates, respectively). The dashed line in each panel shows
women’s adjusted unemployment rate on a diﬀerent scale. Unemployment data are
from the oﬃcial Bureau of Labor Statistics time series and our calculations. Duration
data from 1968 through 1975 were constructed using unpublished BLS data; infor-
mation on the number of people unemployed 15 to 32 and 33 or more weeks was not
available by age. From 1976 forward, the time series were constructed directly from










































































































Monthly NU Transition Rate
Age-Adjusted Monthly Labor Force Transition Rates
Figure 13: The ﬁgure shows women’s and men’s labor-market transitions from 1976
to 2000. All transition rates are adjusted using the Abowd-Zellner correction. λun
and λnu are adjusted for the eﬀects of the 1994 CPS redesign (see Appendix B for









1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Actual Unemployment Rate
Implied Unemployment Rate

















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000









Unemployment Rates Implied by Labor Market Transitions
Figure 14: The top row shows the steady state unemployment rate implied by age-
adjusted labor-market transition rates and the actual age-adjusted unemployment
rate for women and men, 1976 to 2000. The bottom row shows implied and actual
short-term unemployment rates. All ﬂows are adjusted using the Abowd-Zellner
correction. λun and λnu are adjusted for the eﬀects of the 1994 CPS redesign (see
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Effect of Counterfactual Experiments on Unemployment Rates
Figure 15: The ﬁgure shows the steady state unemployment rate and short-term
unemployment rate implied by age-adjusted labor market ﬂows, women and men,
1976 to 2000, allowing for time-variation in all transitions, or only in λeu and λue,
in λun and λnu,o ri nλen and λne. All ﬂows are adjusted using the Abowd-Zellner
correction. λun and λnu are adjusted for the eﬀects of the 1994 CPS redesign (for





















Age-Adjusted Share of Employed Workers
with at least Ten Years Tenure
Figure 16: Age-adjustment weights use the 1983 employment shares of nine age
groups: 25-29,30-34,...,60-64,and65plus. DataareourcalculationsfromtheJan-
uary 1983, January 1987, January 1991, February 1996, February 1998, and February


















Unemployment Rate: CPS and Parallel Survey
Figure 17: This ﬁgure shows the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate in the CPS
and in the parallel survey designed to assess the eﬀect of the CPS redesign imple-
mented in January 1994. The vertical bar indicates the timing of the CPS redesign.









































































Very Long-Term Unemployment Rate
Unemployment Duration and Rates: CPS and Parallel Survey
Figure 18: The top left panel shows the mean duration of unemployment spells cur-
rently in progress. The remaining panels show the share of the labor force with 0 to
4, 15 to 26, and 27 or more weeks unemployment duration (short-term, long-term,
and very long-term unemployment rates, respectively). The solid line in each panel
shows the seasonally-adjusted time series in the CPS, while the dashed line indicates
the seasonally-adjusted time series in the parallel survey designed to assess the eﬀect
of the CPS redesign implemented in January 1994. The vertical bar indicates the
timing of the CPS redesign. Anne Polivka extracted the parallel survey data and we












































































































Figure 19: This ﬁgure shows residuals from regressions of detrended worker-ﬂow rates
on the detrended employment-population ratio. Worker-ﬂow rates are our calcula-
tions from the CPS. The employment level in the latter ratio comes from the CES
survey. The population is the over-16 population used for the CPS weights. All series
are seasonally adjusted and detrended using a HP ﬁlter with smoothing parameter
1,440,000, which eliminates only very low-frequency ﬂuctuations. Vertical lines in-
dicate the timing of the CPS redesign. Breaks in the time series indicate missing
observations.
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